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[23 C.2d 244]

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Charles S. Burnell, Judge. Affirmed.

[L. A. No. 18463. In Bank. Dec. 3, 1943. ]
MYRTLE LEE HARDY, Appellant, v. OLIVER
NORVILLE HARDY, Respondent.
[1] Judgments-Summary Judgments-Affidavits_S ....
Under CdC' P
§,
u.wclency.o e IV. roc. 437c, a motion for Summar 'ud
::~~ may not be gr~~ted except on affidavits in favo; o~ t:;
. Ing p~rty. contaInIng facts sufficient to entitl h' t
Judgment In hIS favor.
e 1m 0 a

[2]

~-summhary JUdgments-Affi.davits-Sufficiency._Where a

1
e soug t recovery under a
t
the theory that th h b [roper y sett ement agreement
unless hi
e u~ an was to pay her $250 a week
s aver~ge weekly Income was less than $1 000 but th
7!r~,~:ent p~~vIded for smaller payments in case of a decreas:
thO 1 e wee y amount received," defendant's affidavit that
. IS angu~ge accurately expressed the intention of the
~Ies contaIned facts sufficient to entitl h' t
parJudgment,
e 1m 0 a summary
elll

(3)

rdi-;-~sumthmat~ JI udgments-Oounter Affidavits-Issue

of Fact
e rIa court's duty to d
t'
.
judgment if th ffi 1 "
e~'!( a mo IOn for summary
e
triable issue of f:ctaav;: InffiOdPp~sItlOn thereto establishes a
h
. n a aVlt, however does n t .
:uc an issue unless it sets forth facts showi~g that t:e r:::e
t:St a good and substantial defense to plaintiff's actio~ y
C. a pa gOOd§ cause of action exists on the merits (See Co~r
IV. roc., 437c.)
.
e

r~] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement A

i

q

pretation: Judgments-Summary Jud
t gre;ments-Inter_
-In a wife's action for breach of
gmen s- ssue of Fact.
ment declaring that the husband :h~:~~e~~ s:~!le:~nt $~~Oee
week, but only a fourth of his income when it fell bel e
a
a week, whe:e the agreement did not indicate that t;W $1,~0
amount receIved by him was to be comput d' t e wee, .y
average inco
h
ffid'
e In erms of hIS
f
me, . er a aVlt, filed in opposition to his m t'
or a summary Judgment assertin th t h
.
0 IOn
industry in who h h '
g a t e mohon picture
,
IC
e was employed regard d
.
weeks as work weeks was insuffi' t t ' ,
e. SuspensIon
in the absence of a sho .
Clen 0 r~Ise an ISSue of fact,
gation in terms of his WIng that. the parhes regarded his obliaverage Income and a
.
ment was correctly entered.
'
summary Judg-

[1] See 7 Oal.Jur. Ten-Year SuPp. 255.
McR. Dig. References: [1-3] ,fud
"
'
Wife, § 157(6); Judgments, § 8a. gments, § 8a; [4J Husband and

Action for breach of a property settlement agreement.
Summary judgment for defendant affirmed.
Roger Marchetti and Bartlett & Kearney for Appellant.

I
!

Benjamin W. Shipman for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On April 24, 1937, plaintifI Myrtle Hardy
and defendant Oliver Hardy executed a property' settlement
agreement providing that defendant would pay $250 weekly
for the support of plaintifI unless his jncome fell"below $1,000
a week, in which case he would pay one-quarter of the amount
he received. PlaintifI contends that defendant was bound_
to pay $250 weekly, regardless of his actual receipts in ai,
particular week, if his income averaged over! $1,000 a week.'
Defendant contends that in any week in which his receipts'
were less than $1,000, he was bound to pay' oruyone-quarter
of the amount actually received, without regard to anyaver~'
age. Defendant is a motion picture actor, and ,'his contract
with his employer gave him a salary in excessdof $1,000 'a~
week for forty weeks in the year. For theother'twe'hre'weeks;
described as "suspension weeks," defendant received $100 a'
week. The employer was free to designate as slispenslon w'eekS l
any twelve weeks in the year. Although defendant's annual{
income averaged more than $1,000 a week, he paid plaintiff'
for the suspension weeks only one-quarter of the amount'
he actually received at such times. On ,April 16, 1941,plain .i "
tifI commenced this action for breach of contract,praymg i
alternatively for reformation. Defendant:6.led an answer·
denying the allegations of the complaint and moved for sum.mary judgment in his favor. It was stipulated that if defen-;
- dant correctly interpreted the contract, no ' issue 'of fact
existed requiring trial. On November 4, 1941, the motion was
granted and judgment was entered on March 26, 1942.
[1] A motion for summary judgment may not be granted
ex<wpt on affidavits in favor of the moving party containing
facts sufficient to entitle him to judgment in his favor. (Code
Civ. Proc., sec. 437c.) [2] Defendant sets forth the pertment
portion of the contract in his affidavit. It provides that" .•.
for the support of :6.rst party (plai.r).tifI), second party (de-

246

HARDY V. HARDY

[23 C.2d

fendant) shall pay to first party from this day forward ...
the sum of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per week
BUT IN THE EVENT the weekly amount received by second
party from any source whatever, either as income, salary,
royalty, commission, bonuses, and/or earnings falls below
one thousand dollars ($1000.00) per week, the amount which
second party is required to pay to first party during the
week or weeks when such income, etc. falls below $1000.00,
is to be reduced to one-fourth of the amount so actually received by second party from the said source."
This provision explicitly imposes an obligation determined
by the amount actually paid to defendant each week. It refers to a decrease in "the weekly amount received" as the
basis for reducing defendant's obligation, and specifies that
reduced payments shall be "one fourth of the amount actually received." Moreover, the contract provides that payments be reduced in the "week" or "weeks" in which defendant's income falls below $1,000. It could not thus take
account of the possibility of a reduction in defendant's income in a single week if it envisaged payments in terms of
defendant's average receipts over a longer period.
Since the language of the contract, standing alone, imposes
an obligation based on defendant's actual weekly receipts,
defendant's affidavit that this lan:luage accurately expresses
the intention of the parties contains facts ~ufficient to entitle
him to judgment. These facts are set forth with sufficient particularity (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 437c), for defendant stated
not only that the writing was consistent with the understand_
ing of the parties, but that the understanding was "that when
.I received, for any week, the Sum of $1000 or more, I paid
the plaintiff $250 for such week from such receipts; when I
received less than $1000 I paid her 25% of the sum received.
... " Moreover, defendant set forth another part of the contract which stated that the parties had examined and discussed all of the provisions of the contract with the aid of
counsel and fully understood their rights and liabilities under
it. In compliance with the code, these facts were set forth
as of defendant's knowledge and are matters to which he
could testify. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 437c.)
[3] It would nevertheless be the trial court's duty to
deny the motion for summary judgment if the affidavit in
opposition thereto established a triable issue of fact. (Walsh
v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439 [116 P.2d 62].) .An affidavit, how-
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- an Issue
.
't
ever, does not raise such
unl
ess
1 sets.. f0.rth "factS
. ' . '.'
showing that the party has a good and' substa~tIal ~efeus~ to
the laintifI's action, ... or that a good cause of ac:l0~ exIsts
on t1e merits." (Code Civ. Proc.,
..> Plallltlff
f
tends that her affidavit, as well.as a ?eposltlon taken 0
e~
testimony, .contains evidence of the ~lrc~msta~ces, s~:.round
ing the execution of the contract that Illdlcate:s Itwas<~tended.,
that defendant's obligation was to be determIlled by hIS. average income.
.
. t
ao
[4] PlaintifI's affidavit sets forth that motlonplc ure . tors are paid high salaries in work weeks and low salarIes
in suspension weeks, that in the motion picture industry ISuc~
salaries are usually described in terms of the work wee~ eve,
and that the work week salary is regarded as "partly ~nclud
in the suspension week period." Thus, it would be sa~d that
a
who received $1,500 in work weeks and $100 Ill. s.uspension weeks had a salary of, $1,500 a week. In des~rl~lll~
the negotiations between plaintiff and defendant, plaIlltI~ s
affidavit states that it was the understanding of the p~rt~es
that defendant was to pay plaintiff $250 a week unless hIS Illcome fell below $1,000 a week, and that no refer~nce v:as
made to suspension weeks. This evidence do~ not aId ~laIll
tifI. The absence of any reference to suspenSIon weeks III no
way suggests that they were to be re~ar~ed as :work weeks.
Whatever the customary view of salarIes III the Ill?ustry, an
actor would hardly regard his receipts as $1,500 III a week
when he was only paid $100. There is no indication that the
parties understood that in suspension weeks "the weekly
amount received by second party from any source whatever,
either as income, salary, royalty, commission, bonuses, and/~r
earnings" meant the salary received in work weeks. ~or ~~
there anything to suggest that the "weekly amo~nt recewe~
by defendant was to be computed in terms. of ~1S ave.rage Illcome over a given period. In fact no perlOd IS speCIfied for
the computation of such an average: Only at the end Of. such
a period could an average be computed, yet defendant IS required to make payments each wee~. In the absence of ~y
agreement as to the basis for computlllg the amount to be paId
each week there would be no way of determini~g the extent of
defendant's obligation if it were regarded Ill. terms of an
average income, and the contract would be VOId for uncertainty. (Talmadge v. Ar·r'uwhead R. Co., 101 Cal. 367 [35 P.

sec~ 437~

~erson

c~n
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100?]; Wineburgh v. Gay, 27 Cal.App. 603 [150 P 1003].
'
plaIntIff's affid 't h f
.
Ince
.
.
aVI t ere ore does not contain facts establishIng .that she had a cause of action, it is not sufficient to raise
:;e~sue(~f f~t,
f summ~ry judgment was correctly enee an 0 Amerwa v. Oil Well Supply 00 12
.
Cal.App.2d 265 [55 P.2d 885] ; Security-First National Bank
of L. A: v. Cryer,. 39 Cal.App.2d 757 [104 P.2d 66].)
The Judgment IS affirmed.

Sa~~n~ v. Pedrotti, 103 Cal.App. 203 [284 P. 472])' S·

;nd

an

GdiSbsohn, C. J., Shenk,J., Ourtis, J., Edmonds J. Oarter J
c auer, J., concurred.
'"
.,

[L. A. No. 18723. In Bank. Dec. 7, 1943.J

R.D~N~ISKIN

et al., Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL AOOIOOMMISSION and A " F MINER• R espond ents.

[1]

~ndepcndent Contractors-Definition:

SuperviSion of Work b

d;:e:e:~i!a~!O~he ~:~:~e~~nden~ contractor is one who ren:

occupation, following his empr~;~~e~::!::t oe~pl?y~~nt or
suIt o~ the work, and not the means whereb ~Y'sIn
e recomphshed, whereas the relationship of er! 1 I to bde aeployee exists h
th
p oyer an emtrol or direct ~o;n:;:~vor~ :~io~:rd~~t:i:ss ;:~ rig~~ to conlto be accomplished.
as e resu t
[2] ld.-Determination of Right of Control 0
certaining wheth
. - ne means of ascontrol ho
er or not the employer retains the right to
whether i; i~h~ WOt~k shall be ~one, is the determination of
obeyed. '
s ruc lOns were gIven, they would have to be

Plo~~r ~~~u~~ance~ under which existence of relationship of emll68 S . In epen ent contractor is predicable note 19 A L R
. ee,. also, 13 CaI.Jur. 1014, 1024; 27 Am.J~r.
486 . . •
McK. DIg. References: [lJ Independent Contractors §§ 1 ..
5J Independent Contractors § 14' [3J I d
d
'
,6, [2,
"
n epen ent Contractors
§ 5' [4J I d
, . n ependent Contractors §§ 7 10' [6J W k
'C '
'"
or men s ompensatlOn § 271(4)' [7J
' . Workmen's Compensation § 271 (5)' [8J
W orkm en~s CompensatlOn
§ 170' [9] W km "
. ,
§ 272(2).
" o r en s Compensation,

48i,
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[3a, 3b] Id.-Right to Discharge Workmen as Factor.-A strong
factor tending to show the relationship of an employee is the
employer's right to terminate the work at his pleasure. The
right immediately to discharge a workman involves the right
of control.
[4] Id.-Manner of Payment: Freedom of Action.-In determining whether the relationship is that of independent contractor
or that of master and servant, neither the manner of payment
nOT the choosing by the employee of his own hours of work is
conclusive of the relationship.
[5] Id.-Determination of Right of Control.-Where there is
shown no express agreement as to the right of the claimed
employer to control the mode and manner of doing the work,
the existence or nonexistence of the right must be determined
by reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances shown,
and is a question of mixed law and fact.
[6] Workmen's Compensation-Certiorari-Review of FindingsSubstantial Evidence.-Where there is substantial evidence to
support the findings and order of the Industrial Accident
Commission, the reviewing court may not substitute its views
for those of the commission and annul the award.
[7] Id. - Certiorari - Review of Findings - Inferences.- If the
findings of the Industrial Accident Commission are supported
by inferences which may fairly be drawn from the evidence,
even though the evidence is susceptible. of opposing inferences,
the reviewing court will not disturb the award.·
[Sa, Sb] Id. - Proceedings - Evidence-SufficiencY~Relation of
Employer and Employee.-The evidence supported' aftnding
of the Industrial Accident Commission 'that a pEirson injured
while working on a mining claim was an employee of the mine
owners, rather than an independent contractor or the employee
of a fellow workman, where, from. the fact that the mine
owners could have terminated the work at their pleasure, it
could be inferred that they had both .the :t:ight to give special
instructions to the two workmen and the power to require
obedience' thereto, and where said workmen were partners
for this particular work, within the meaning of Lab. Code,
§ 3360. (Disapproving of contrary holding on' similar' factual
situations in Donlon Brus. v. IndustrialAcc.Oom., 173 Cal. 250,
159 P. 715; Fidelity cf1 Deposit 00. v~ Brush, 176 Cal. 448, 168 P.
890; and Parsons v. Industrial Ace. ;Oom., 178 Cal. 394, 173 P.
585.)
.
[9] Id.-Certiorari-Review of Findings-Relationship of Employer and Employee.-Generally speakhig, it is a question of
fact to be determined by the Industrial Accident Commission

